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OPPY ON THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS
J. P. Moreland

Graham Oppy has launched the most effective criticism to date of an argument
for God’s existence from the existence of irreducible mental states or their
regular correlation with physical states (AC). I seek to undercut Oppy’s
central defeaters of AC. In particular, I argue, first, that Oppy has not
provided successful defeaters against the use of a distinctive form of explanation—personal explanation—employed in premise (3) of AC; second, I
expose a confusion on Oppy’s part with respect to AC’s premise (5), and
show that this confusion results in a failure to grasp adequately the dialectical force of (5). As a result, Oppy fails to offer adequate rejoinders to (5), or
so I shall argue.

I sometimes hear laypeople express, quite commonsensically, an argument
to the effect that since we have minds and mind can’t come from matter,
there must be a Grand Mind that best explains the existence of our minds.
In the last thirty years or so, a small handful of philosophers have advanced
this sort of argument in a more rigorous, careful way.1 And while the argument has been endorsed by some well-known natural theologians,2 it
has not garnered much attention from critics or those sympathetic to it. A
notable exception to this rule is Graham Oppy, who has launched the most
effective criticism of the argument to date in conjunction with Swinburne’s
formulation of it.3 Oppy tends to pepper an argument in his cross hairs with
numerous, bullet-like criticisms, and his treatment of the argument from
consciousness (hereafter, AC) is no exception to this rule. Fortunately for
1
See Robert Adams, “Flavors, Colors, and God,” reprinted in Contemporary Perspectives
on Religious Epistemology, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 225–240; Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon,
1979), chapter 9; The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 183–196; Is There a
God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69–94; “The Origin of Consciousness,” in Cosmic
Beginnings and Human Ends, ed. Clifford N. Matthews and Roy Abraham Varghese (Chicago and
La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1995), 355–378; J. P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God
(New York: Routledge, 2008); “The Argument from Consciousness,” in A Companion to Natural
Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009),
282–343; The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (London: S.
C. M. Press, 2009), chapter 2.
2
See William Lane Craig, “Natural Theology: Introduction,” in Philosophy of Religion, ed.
William Lane Craig (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 76–77; Charles Taliaferro,
Evidence and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 407–409, 437.
3
Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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my purposes, some of his criticisms target idiosyncrasies in Swinburne’s
particular formulation of AC,4 others I have addressed elsewhere,5 and others are generic difficulties with arguments for God and not problems with
AC in particular.6 Thus, I shall limit my response to Oppy accordingly.
In particular, I shall, first, argue that Oppy has not provided successful
defeaters against the use of a distinctive form of explanation—personal explanation—employed in premise (3) of AC (see below); second, expose a
confusion on Oppy’s part with respect to AC’s premise (5) (see below); and
third, show that this confusion results in a failure to grasp adequately the
dialectical force of (5). As a result, Oppy fails to offer adequate rejoinders
to (5), or so I shall argue.
The General Structure of AC
AC may be expressed in inductive or deductive form. As an inductive argument, AC may be construed as claiming that given theism and naturalism as the live options fixed by our background beliefs, theism provides
a better explanation of consciousness than naturalism and, thus, receives
some confirmation from the existence of consciousness.7 The inductive
form of AC may be expressed along Bayesian lines or construed as an
inference to the best explanation.
AC may also be expressed in deductive form, and its advocates will
(or should) argue that it is sound and contains premises that are more
plausible than their contradictories.8 Here is one deductive version of AC:
(1) Genuinely non-physical mental states exist.
(2) If genuinely non-physical mental states exist, then there is an explanation for the existence of mental states.
(3) If there is an explanation for the existence of mental states, then the
explanation for the existence of mental states is either a personal
explanation or a natural scientific explanation.
(4) The explanation for the existence of mental states is either a personal or a natural scientific explanation.
4
I have in mind things such as Swinburne’s distinctions among partial, full, complete,
ultimate and absolute explanations, and Swinburne’s employment of theoretical simplicity.
5
For example, I have defended property/event dualism as it figures into premise (1) of
AC in “The Knowledge Argument Revisited,” International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (June
2003), 219–228.
6
For example, Oppy argues against premise (7) below on the grounds that alternatives
to orthodox theism—polytheism, a committee of gods, etc.—are plausible. See Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 401.
7
I explain why panpsychism should not be considered a live option alongside naturalism and theism in Consciousness and the Existence of God, chapter 6.
8
Oppy would not accept this characterization of a successful argument. For an analysis
and response to Oppy on this point, see William Lane Craig, “Arguing Successfully about
God: A Review Essay of Graham Oppy’s Arguing about Gods,” Philosophia Christi 10:2 (2008),
435–442.
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(5) The explanation for the existence of mental states is not a natural
scientific one.
(6) Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.
(7) If the explanation for the existence of mental states is personal, then
it is theistic.
(8) Therefore, the explanation for the existence of mental states is theistic.
Before I address Oppy’s arguments, I should say a word about (4).
(4) turns on the fact that personal explanation differs from event-causal
covering law explanations employed in natural science. Associated with
event causation is a covering law model of explanation according to which
some event (the explanandum) is explained by giving a correct deductive
or inductive argument for that event. Such an argument contains two features in its explanans: a (universal or statistical) law of nature and initial
causal conditions. Sometimes a covering law explanation is underwritten
by some sort of realist model of the entities involved in the causal processes in view.
By contrast, a personal explanation (divine or otherwise) of some state of
affairs brought about intentionally by a person will employ notions such
as the intention of the agent and the relevant power of the agent that was
exercised in causing the state of affairs. In general, a personal explanation
of some basic result R brought about intentionally by person P where this
bringing about of R is a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R
occur and the basic power B that P exercised to bring about R. P, I, and B
provide a personal explanation of R: agent P brought about R by exercising
power B in order to realize intention I as an irreducibly teleological goal.
Personal Explanation and Premise (3)
Oppy’s first argument against personal explanation as a unique explanatory form is that if eliminative materialism is true, personal explanations
are not real explanations: “[T]he ‘eliminative’ view [implies] that, in a
properly basic sense, personal explanations are not genuinely explanations at all. . . . [I]f personal explanation is merely apparent—that is, not
genuine—explanation, then, on Swinburne’s own account, theism will
not be a genuinely explanatory theory.”9
Now eliminative materialism is a highly contentious theory that has
not garnered much acceptance, even among physicalist philosophers
of mind. Moreover, I have argued elsewhere that our knowledge of the
existence and nature of mental states is in accordance with their selfpresenting nature and due to direct awareness.10 Thus, that knowledge
is not primarily based on mental states serving as explanatorily useful

9

Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 386.
Moreland, “The Knowledge Argument Revisited,” 219–228.
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posits in, say, folk psychology, that could be undercut by eliminating
mental states in favor of the postulates of a more acceptable theory.
However, waiving these points, we can still ask whether Oppy’s argument is a successful defeater of personal explanation as employed in (3).
I don’t think it is. The main justification for premise (3) is the difference
between libertarian agency and lawlike event causality. Now, even if we
grant for the sake of argument that eliminative materialism is true for
finite, conscious beings, a defense of (3) requires only a concept of libertarian agency and personal explanation, even if we grant a physical, eventcausal theory of action for, say, human acts. Indeed, most theists take God
to be a libertarian agent who exemplifies the mental properties relevant
to agency, so whether or not humans are such agents or have such mental
states is irrelevant. If we have such a clear conception of personal explanation, then even if human acts do not fall under it, under the right circumstances, it could be argued that a form of explanation clearly available to
us is now to be employed. What those circumstances are and whether they
obtain are more centrally related to premises (2) and (5) of AC and not (3),
so I need not go into them in detail here. For example, someone may be
squeamish about a vicious infinite regress here and believe that the notion
of first-moving active power entailed by Swinburnean personal explanation is the only fitting stopping place for such a regress. Or one may think
that personal explanation is an essential component of a successful kalam
cosmological argument, and go on to employ it here regarding consciousness. What those circumstances are need not concern us further because
enough has been said to refute Oppy’s argument against (3).
It could be responded that if we grant eliminative materialism for the
sake of argument, then there just are no conscious properties/events that
need to be explained. But, again, this would be a problem with the explanandum in (1), not with the personal explanans in (3). Obviously, if
mental events do not exist, AC is a non-starter and it’s advocate will need
to defend property/event dualism. Our task here is to defend personal
explanation as employed in (3).
Oppy’s second argument is raised against Swinburne’s attempt to defend the irreducibility of personal to scientific event-event causation by
presenting a case of causal deviancy in which a person in an audience
intends to get the speaker’s attention, and this intent causes him to fidget
which, in turn, does get the speaker’s attention.11 By contrast, Oppy argues
that such reducibility is quite plausible. In this context, note that what
Oppy claims is reducible is not mental states to physical states, though he
may, indeed, believe such is possible. Rather, Oppy has in view the reduction of personal explanation and intentional action to event-causal explanation and a causal theory of action. Swinburne’s point is that in such
cases, an event causal theory of action is satisfied, but the act is not an
intentional one; thus, intentional action cannot be reduced to event-event
Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 387.
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causation nor can personal explanation be reduced to scientific explanation. Oppy’s response is that Swinburne is correct to see the fidgeter as
failing to exhibit intentional action, but Swinburne cites the wrong reason
for the failure. Oppy’s argument here is abridged and opaque, but I think
he has something like this in mind. A causal theory of action will say that
the fidgeter’s act was not an intentional one because it will employ a total
and not partial explanation of the mental cause of action, and in this case,
there are mental causes of his fidgeting besides the desire to be noticed
that are irrelevant to the intentional action to be noticed (e.g., the fidgeter’s lack of self-worth) and there is an absence of mental states relevant
to making the act an intentional one (e.g., the belief that by fidgeting, the
person will be noticed by the speaker). Thus, Swinburne’s example does
not undercut the idea that personal explanation can be reduced to scientific explanation.
I have two responses to Oppy’s counterargument. First, he is confused
about the nature of type reduction and, as a result, draws the wrong conclusion from his argument. In type reduction (e.g., painfulness is C-fiber
firing) there are two non-synonymous, co-referring terms/concepts. In
such reductions, the intentional object of the reductively targeted term
or concept is identified with the intentional object of the favored term.
In such cases, the intentional “objects” are reduced, but not the referring
terms/concepts. Regarding the latter, there is actually a replacement. For
example, after reduction it is believed that there is nothing that accurately
corresponds to the dualist pre-reductive concept of pain, and the nature
of pain turns out to be accurately captured by “being a C-fiber firing.”
Thus, reduction occurs with respect to the intentional object, and a type
of replacement occurs with respect to the co-referring concepts.
This point is grasped by sophisticated attempts to reduce libertarian
agency to an event-causal sequence. For example, John Bishop argues that
there are no such things as libertarian types of acts and, accordingly, reduces all such types of acts along event-causal lines.12 But when it comes
to the concept of libertarian action, he does not reduce it to the concept of
event-causal action. Instead, he offers a concept of the latter that is close to
the former, and recommends that we eliminate the concept of libertarian
action in favor of his alternative.
Now, explanations are conceptual entities. Thus, even if human intentional actions are identified with relevant event-causal chains, it does not
follow that the concept of personal explanation has been analyzed into
the concept of an event-causal scientific explanation. We simply have two
different concepts that co-refer in the case of human action, along with
the replacement of the former, less preferable concept with the latter, more
accurate concept. But, then, we are back to eliminativism regarding the
concept of personal explanation, and my criticisms above would be relevant for defeating this move.
John Bishop, Natural Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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Second, it is far from clear that Oppy’s reason for the failure of the fidgeter’s act to be an intentional one is preferable to Swinburne’s. In general,
it seems that a causal chain from event e1 to e2 could always be deviant.
Thus, even if we take into account the “complete” set of prior mental states
including all and only those relevant to the fidgeter’s act, these could still
produce the act in the wrong way and, thus, fail to satisfy the necessary
conditions for being an intentional act. For a libertarian like Swinburne,
the issue here is not the “completeness” or lack thereof of the relevant
prior mental state, but the way it figures into the act. For Swinburne, an
intentional act is caused by the agent, not his prior mental states which
are, instead, the reason for acting.
Suppose one were to respond that in certain basic actions between a
basic intent and a basic result, there just is no intermediate event and, so,
no possibility of causal deviancy. In this case, a reduction of intentional to
event-causal action is possible. Perhaps, it could be argued, success here
could fund the hope that with more work, a similar reduction will be
forthcoming with respect to non-basic actions constituted by action plans.
Granting for the sake of argument that there are such basic actions with
no intermediate events, I still do not think the reduction works because it
is still possible to employ simultaneous causation to generate a relevant
deviant causal factor. Modifying a recent discussion of simultaneous causation by E. J. Lowe,13 consider the following diagram:
T0

T1

E2

E1

E3

In this case E1 at time T0 partially and directly causes E3 at T1 and partially and indirectly causes E3 though simultaneously causing E2 at T0.
Here, the occurrence of E3 is counterfactually dependent on each causal
route. Let E1 and E2 be the mental states relevant to the basic action result
E3 and let the chain from E1 to E3 via E2 be deviant. The occurrence of E3
seems to be unintentional because it is partially brought about by a deviant chain and not solely by the direct action of the relevant mental state.
Such a scenario seems coherent and possible, and unless it can be shown
to be otherwise, it seems to provide a counterexample to the reduction of
basic actions to (scientific) event-causal sequences.

13
See E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48–51. Lowe’s
discussion involved three causal chains, not just two, because he is interested in addressing
a version of physical causal closure. He also has it that the relevant simultaneous cause is
a mental one, but I see no reason to limit simultaneous causation in this way. If the reader
disagrees, then just use an evil demon for the simultaneous cause.
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I conclude that Oppy has not provided sufficient defeaters to warrant
the rejection of personal explanation as employed in premise (3).14
Confusion about the Concept of “Natural” in Premise (5)
There are two different meanings to “natural” relevant to (5). Oppy seems
to employ the wrong sense. Not only is it wrong, but of the two, it is relatively anemic. As a result, Oppy fails to appreciate the strength of AC’s
employment of the existence of mental states as a defeater for naturalism
and confirmation of theism. Thus, his own counterarguments to (5) do not
have the dialectical force Oppy takes them to have.
What are the two different meanings to “natural”? The first one is relatively easy to characterize: “natural” means “regular or normal (usual).”
In this sense, to say that mental states are natural is to say simply that they
are regularly correlated with physical states or that they occur normally,
perhaps in lawlike ways. According to the second definition, “natural”
means “not surprising or puzzling, at home and not odd.” In this sense, to
say that mental states are natural is to say their appearance is not surprising or odd, but rather quite at home, given the rest of a naturalist creation
story (the Grand Story) and ontology.15
Relatively speaking, the former sense is anemic and it is the one employed by Oppy. However, advocates of AC utilize the more robust, latter
sense.16 Before I demonstrate my claim about Oppy, however, the second sense needs a bit more clarification, and given present concerns, let
us limit our discussion to naturalism as a rival to theism. Note that the
second sense has an epistemic/explanatory component and an ontological component, viz., “surprising, not puzzling” and “at home, not odd,”
respectively.
Regarding the naturalist Grand Story, scientific theories that are paradigm cases of epistemic/explanatory success (e.g., the atomic theory of
matter, evolutionary biology) employ combinatorial modes of explanation. Thus any process that constitutes the Grand Story and any entity in
the naturalist ontology should exhibit an ontological structure analyzable
in terms that are isomorphic with such modes of explanation. Perhaps
more than anyone, Colin McGinn has defended this idea along with what
14
Oppy does, however, raise an effective objection to a passage on page 46 of Swinburne’s 1979 edition of The Existence of God (New York: Oxford University Press 1979; rev.
2004). Swinburne argues that two full explanations of some explanandum E imply overdetermination because each is necessary and sufficient to explain E. Oppy correctly shows
that in fact, and even on Swinburne’s own account, overdetermination requires only that
the two competing causal factors are each sufficient, not necessary and sufficient. Interestingly, in the 2004, second (revised) edition of The Existence of God, the offending passage has
been removed (see p. 46).
15
The Grand Story amounts to an etiological account of how all entities whatsoever have
come to be, told in terms of an event causal story and combinatorial processes described in
natural scientific terms with a central role given to the atomic theory of matter and evolutionary biology. The Grand Story eschews agent causation and irreducible teleology.
16
This is the sense I use in my defenses of AC. For Swinburne, see The Existence of God,
1979 edition, 52, 170–174; in the revised 2004 edition, see 204–209.
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he takes it to entail, viz., the inability of naturalism to explain genuinely
unique, simple emergent properties:
Can we gain any deeper insight into what makes the problem of consciousness run against the grain of our thinking? Are our modes of theorizing
about the world of the wrong shape to extend to the nature of mind? I think
we can discern a characteristic structure possessed by successful scientific
theories, a structure that is unsuitable for explaining consciousness. . . . Is
there a “grammar” to science that fits the physical world but becomes shaky
when applied to the mental world? Perhaps the most basic aspect of thought
is the operation of combination. This is the way in which we think of complex
entities as resulting from the arrangement of simpler parts. There are three
aspects to this basic idea: the atoms we start with, the laws we use to combine them, and the resulting complexes . . . I think it is clear that this mode
of understanding is central to what we think of as scientific theory; our scientific faculty involves representing the world in this combinatorial style.17

Thus, given the Grand Story, the explanatory aspect of “natural” implies that structural properties (being water, methane) are not surprising
or puzzling, whereas genuinely emergent ones (secondary qualities, mental properties) are.
The second component of “natural” is straightforwardly ontological:
“at home, not odd.” In this sense, the naturalness of a postulated entity
is a function of its relationship to the ontology of the overall theory of
which it is a part. The types of entities postulated, along with the sorts of
properties they possess and the relations into which they enter, should
be at home with other entities in the theory, and, in this sense, be natural
for the theory. Some entity (particular thing, process, property, or relation) e is natural for a theory T just in case either e is a central, core entity
of T or e bears a relevant similarity to central, core entities in e’s category
within T. If e is in a category such as substance, force, property, event,
relation, or cause, e should bear a relevant similarity to other entities of T
in that category. This is a formal definition and the material content given
to it will depend on the theory in question. The basic entities constitutive
of the Grand Story provide the material content for naturalism, viz., the
particulars, properties, relations and laws that characterize the entities of
microphysics, their combinatorial processes, and the structural entities
that result. From the time of Boyle to the present, these entities have been
construed as bereft of secondary qualities or mental properties.
It is worth pointing out that, given rivals R and S, the postulation of e in
R is ad hoc and question-begging against advocates of S if e bears a relevant
similarity to the appropriate entities in S, and in this sense is “at home” in
S, but fails to bear this relevant similarity to the appropriate entities in R.18
17
Collin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 55–56. Cf. 54–62,
90, 95.
18
For example, suppose theory S explains phenomena in terms of discrete corpuscles
and actions by contact, while R uses continuous waves to explain phenomena. If some
phenomenon x were best explained in corpuscularian categories, it would be ad hoc and
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The notion of “being ad hoc” is notoriously difficult to specify precisely. It
is usually characterized as an intellectually inappropriate adjustment of a
theory whose sole epistemic justification is to save the theory from falsification. Such an adjustment involves adding a new supposition to a theory
not already implied by its other features. In the context of evaluating rivals
R and S, the principle just mentioned provides a sufficient condition for
the postulation of e to be ad hoc and question-begging.
The issue of naturalness is relevant to theory assessment between rivals
in that it provides a criterion for advocates of a theory to claim that their
rivals have begged the question against them or adjusted their theory in an
inappropriate, ad hoc way. And though this need not be the case, naturalness can be related to the claim that some entity is basic and need only be
correlated with other entities: Naturalness can provide a means of deciding the relative merits of accepting theory R, which depicts phenomenon
e as basic, vs. embracing S, which takes e to be explainable in more basic
terms. If e is natural in S but not in R, it will be difficult for advocates of R
to justify the bald assertion that e is basic in R and that all proponents of
R need to do is describe e and correlate it with other phenomena in R as
opposed to explaining e. Such a claim by advocates of R will be even more
problematic if S provides an explanation for e.19
As noted above, Oppy employs “regular or normal” for “natural.” I say
this for three reasons: First, in rebutting Swinburne’s argument that natural
scientific laws cannot explain the regular connections between enormously
qualitatively different kinds of events, Oppy claims that we regularly find
adequate scientific accounts of such different kinds of events in the macro
and micro worlds that are quite natural, indeed. And he offers, as an example, explanations of the macro-phenomenon of heat conductivity in an
iron bar in terms of the motion and kinetic energy of the bar’s microscopic
parts.20 Oppy’s analogy is a bad one if “natural” means “not surprising or
puzzling, at home and not odd,” because, given the reductive analysis of
heat conductivity to the micro-phenomenon of molecular vibration (in solids) and translational motion and collisions (in liquids and gases), irreducible mental states are clearly surprising and odd with respect to brain states
in a way that heat conductivity is not with respect to molecular vibration.
question-begging for advocates of R simply to adjust their entities to take on particle properties in the case of x. Such properties would not bear a relevant similarity to other entities
in R and would be more natural and at home in S.
19
For example, suppose that R is Neo-Darwinism and S is a version of punctuated equilibrium theory. Simply for the sake of illustration, suppose further that R depicts evolutionary
transitions from one species to another to involve running through a series of incrementally
different transitional forms except for some specific transition e which is taken as a basic
phenomenon, say, the discrete jump from amphibians to reptiles. S pictures evolutionary
transitions in general, including e, as evolutionary jumps to be explained in certain ways
that constitute S. In this case, given the presence of S, it would be hard for advocates of R to
claim that their treatment of e is adequate against S. Phenomenon e clearly counts in favor
of S over against R.
20
Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 399.
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However, if “natural” means “regular,” then both types of correlations are
natural in that they occur regularly, and his analogy goes through. Given
that in a number of places, Oppy recommends reductive analyses of mental states, the analogy between mental-physical event correlation and heat
conductivity-micro-vibratory phenomena becomes intelligible: Both are
correlated because one phenomenon is reducible to the other.
My second reason for thinking that Oppy is using ‘natural’ in the ‘regular or normal’ sense is based on the following passage:
If it is hard to see how there can be simple, natural connections between
mental states and brain states, then it is hard to see how there can be a simple, ‘natural’ way for an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god to establish
connections between mental states and brain states. Given the alleged difficulties that confront the materialist hypothesis that there are simple and
natural connections between mental states and brain states, surely there
are equally considerable difficulties that confront the contention that it is
simple and natural to suppose that there is an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god that brings it about that there are connections between mental
states and brain states.21

This passage makes perfect sense if “natural” means “regular or normal.” Moreover, the context of this passage resides in Oppy’s response
to Swinburne’s challenge “to establish natural, law-like connections between mental events and brain events,”22 and Swinburne clearly employs
“natural” here to mean “regular.” Finally, Oppy’s remarks do not make
sense if “natural” means “not surprising, at home, not odd.” On this reading, given theism, there is nothing unnatural (surprising, not at home,
odd) about mental states or their natural (regular, usual) correlation with
brain states, since the states and their correlations bear a relevant similarity to other entities in a theistic ontology and are explanatory within the
resources of divine omnipotence. In this case, there is no difficulty with
these being “natural” (not surprising, at home, not odd) given orthodox
monotheism, contrary to what Oppy claims. Thus, it is more charitable to
interpret “natural” as “regular or normal.”
Here is my third reason for interpreting “natural” as I do: In rebutting Swinburne’s argument that there are serious difficulties in seeing the
connection between mental and brain states as a natural one, Oppy says
this: “Chalmers (1996) provides a nice example of a theory in which there
are simple, natural connections between phenomenal states and physical
states, even though there is no, even in-principle, reduction of the one to
the other.”23 However, Chalmers’s approach is a version of panpsychism,
and it is “natural” in only two senses: it is not theistic and it establishes
“regular and normal” connections between the relevant states. But it is
not natural in the sense that panpsychist mental entities are odd and not
Ibid., 400.
Ibid., 398.
23
Ibid., 399.
21

22
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at home in a physicalist, naturalist ontology, nor can their existence be adequately explained by the Grand Story with its combinatorial processes,
a point that Chalmers acknowledges.24 In fact, in what may be the most
authoritative presentation and defense of panpsychism in recent years,
David Skirbina frankly notes that “throughout history, panpsychism has,
at almost every point, served as an antipode” to naturalism precisely because mental entities are odd and not at home in the naturalist ontological
depiction of matter as brute, mechanical stuff.25
Oppy’s use of “natural” is dialectically significant. It leads him to underestimate the difficulty that the existence of mental states (or their regular
correlation with brain states) presents to naturalism as stated in premise (5), and to overestimate the ease with which naturalism can embrace
and explain the irreducibly mental. These inaccurate estimates occur in
two places.
The first resides in Oppy’s defeater of (5) which suggests that a naturalistic evolutionary explanation of mental correlations is available to the
naturalist.26 Now if Oppy is after regular correlations here, then given the
existence of mental states and certain assumptions about their causal relation to brain states on the one hand, and environmental inputs and outputs on the other, an evolutionary explanation is, indeed, readily available
in terms of the reproductive advantage certain correlations confer on the
organisms that exhibit them. However, if the issue is one of explaining the
origin of mental states in the first place, given the naturalist ontology and
the simple rearrangement of parts in the atomic theory of matter and the
processes of mutation, genetic drift, and so forth, then no such evolutionary explanation will be forthcoming. Such an explanation is the wrong
kind of explanation altogether. It may be apt for explaining the origin of
certain new relational structures, but it is singularly inadequate to explain
the origin of sui generis, new, simple emergent properties by way of the
evolutionary rearrangement of parts bereft even of the potentiality for the
mental. This second task is more severe, and it is hardly addressed by
Oppy’s brief appeal to evolutionary explanation.
The second inaccurate estimate resides in Oppy’s failure to assess
accurately the expectedness of mental entities given naturalism and background knowledge: P(e/¬h&k) where e = the existence of mental states,
¬h = naturalism (technically, it is the negation of theism, but we can assume
that theism and naturalism are the only live options for present purposes), and k = background knowledge. Basically, Oppy rests content to rebut
Swinburne’s arguments that P(e/¬h&k) is much lower than P(e/h&k) and,
having done that in his mind, to conclude that there is no reason to see
the former as lower than the latter. Now, in spite of how things go with
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Swinburne’s reasons for this conclusion, I have already given a reason, in
terms of the basic ontology of naturalism and the combinatorial processes
constitutive of the Grand Story, for thinking that P(e/¬h&k) is low indeed,
given the proper characterization of “natural.”
Furthermore, recall that in the early days of emergentism in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, emergent properties were characterized epistemically, viz., as those which were unpredictable, even from
a God’s-eye perspective, from a complete knowledge of the subvenient
base. That subvenient base provided no explanatory or predictive grounds
for emergent properties precisely as emergent entities. Now it makes no
difference for the relevance of this point that today we construe emergent
properties ontologically and not epistemically. Even on the ontological
construal, emergent properties are completely sui generis relative to the
entities and processes at the subvenient base. In this regard, the following
characterization by Timothy O’Connor may be taken as canonical:
An emergent property of type E will appear only in physical systems
achieving some specific threshold of organized complexity. From an empirical point of view, this threshold will be arbitrary, one that would not
be anticipated by a theorist whose understanding of the world was derived
from theories developed entirely from observations of physical systems
below the requisite complexity. In optimal circumstances, such a theorist
would come to recognize the locally determinative interactive dispositions
of basic physical entities. Hidden from his view, however, would be the
tendency . . . to generate an emergent state.27

For these reasons, P(e/¬h&k) is so low as to approximate zero. And in
light of my discussion earlier about how the presence of a rival affects the
dialectical situation, it is question-begging and ad hoc for Oppy simply
to label the existence of mental states (or their correlations with physical
states) as a basic, naturalistic fact in need of no explanation.
At this point, someone may advance the following counterargument:
There is reason to think that P(e/¬h&k) is not low. Suppose we let e be the
property of wetness and not-h be the hypothesis of H2O. Then while e is
totally unexpected, it is also physically necessary and so highly probable.
The same could be said for mental properties and events.
In response, the first thing to note is Timothy O’Connor’s point that
emergent properties must be shown to arise by way of causal necessitation from a micro-physical base if we are to “render emergent phenomena
naturalistically explicable.”28 Among his reasons for this claim is the assertion that if the link between micro-base and emergent properties is a
contingent one, then the only explanation for the existence and constancy
of the link is a theistic explanation.29
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Second, setting aside reductive analyses of secondary qualities (such
analyses render secondary qualities a bad analogy with mental properties/events as employed in AC and would be equivalent to denying premise [1]), since the mechanical philosophy of Galileo, Locke, and others,
secondary qualities have been ubiquitously construed as contingently
related to the relevant physical states. This can be seen by the fact that,
though it has (rightly) fallen on hard times these days, for centuries the
adjectival sense datum theory of perception was widely adopted in Western thought. On this view, secondary qualities (wetness, being red) could
be lifted out of the physical object in the mind-independent world without perturbing that object, and placed in the mind as characteristics of
sensation. This move entails that secondary qualities are not features of
objects that are necessitated by their micro-bases; thus, even if we leave
secondary qualities in objects, they are still contingently related to the
objects’ physical aspects. Moreover, just as we have very strong intuitions
that zombie, disembodied, and inverted qualia worlds are possible, even
within the range of worlds physically and relevantly similar to the actual
world, so we have the same intuitions about secondary qualities (redness
could have been correlated with a different wavelength, etc.). These intuitions are present whether we leave irreducible secondary qualities in the
external objects themselves or place them in the mind.
Finally, along with mental and normative properties, secondary qualities are paradigm cases of sui generis new kinds of properties not characteristic of the micro-physical world. As such, it was customary in the early
days of the mechanical philosophy to explain the existence and regular
correlation of the instantiation of secondary qualities and physical properties as being the result of “God’s good pleasure.” Thus, the connections
between secondary qualities and their correlated physical bases are contingent and have, themselves, been used in an argument for God in a way
analogous to AC.
Space considerations forbid me from doing much here by way of estimating P(e/h&k) except to note one thing: given the proper understanding
of “natural,” it is clear that finite mental states are ontologically natural
(they bear a relevant similarity to the core entities in the theistic ontology, viz., God’s mental states) and explanatorily natural (their appearance
is within the powers of Divine omnipotence). Given further reasons for
why God would bring about finite conscious beings, P(e/h&k) is nowhere
near as low as P(e/¬h&k) which approaches zero. At least that is what the
advocate of AC will argue.
Oppy’s misconstrual of “natural,” then, results in a mistaken assessment of P(e/¬h&k), especially in relation to P(e/h&k). But his misconstrual
also results in Oppy’s identification of the wrong factor as the key one for
a Bayesian assessment of AC. To see this, recall that:
P(h/e&k)
P(¬h/e&k)

=

P(h)
P(¬h)

x

P(e/h&k)
P(e/¬h&k)
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Oppy claims that the key probability for AC is the prior probability of
theism (and, I assume, the ratio of which it is a part). According to Oppy,
given that this is not high, Swinburne’s inductive arguments for orthodox
monotheism “are in serious trouble.”30 Oppy reaches this conclusion before he begins to consider the expectedness of mental states on naturalism
and theism, though I am certain that he takes comfort in this conclusion
based on his later claim about the parity of the estimates regarding expectedness. Now, clearly, a low prior probability of theism does not by
itself undercut AC. Even if that probability is low, it could be offset by
an extremely low P(e/¬h&k) which would, in turn, make the key ratio be
P(e/h&k) over P(e/¬h&k). And that is what an advocate of AC should argue, for even if P(h) and P(e/h&k) are somewhat low, the really low factor
is P(e/¬h&k) which, as I said above, approximates zero.
My purpose has not been to argue for AC, but to respond to Oppy’s
main criticisms of it. And while I cannot argue the point here, it seems
that the best move for Oppy to make is to reject (1) in favor of some version
of strict physicalism, an option he regularly considers throughout his essay. For some, this move will be obvious and it is a small price to pay. For
others, it is fodder for a reductio against naturalism.31
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